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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP MNUC PARM PINR SNAR IZ IR IN AF JA
NATO, G-8, UNSC
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' APRIL 10 MEETING WITH
JAPANESE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TSUNEO NISHIDA

Classified By: EAP:K Stephens, Reason 1.4(b)and(d)

11. (U) Classified by: Acting EAP A/S Kathleen Stephens, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

### 12. (U) Participants:

Morning meeting

U.S.
Under Secretary Burns
EAP A/S Kathy Stephens (acting)
P Special Assistant Andrew Shaw
EAP/J Director Wendell Albright (acting)

JAPAN
Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida
Motohide Yoshikawa, Director General, Middle Eastern and
African Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Nobokatsu Kanehara, Minister, Embassy of Japan
Shogo Yoshitake, Deputy Director, First North American
Division, MOFA
African Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Lunch

U.S.
Under Secretary Burns
EAP A/S Kathy Stephens (acting)
P Special Assistant Andrew Shaw

JAPAN
Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida
Nobokatsu Kanehara, Minister, Embassy of Japan
Shogo Yoshitake, Deputy Director, First North American
Division, MOFA

Afternoon meeting

U.S.
Under Secretary Burns
Treasury U/S Stuart Levey
EB A/S Tony Wayne
EAP A/S Kathy Stephens (acting)
P Special Assistant Andrew Shaw

JAPAN
Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida
Motohide Yoshikawa, Director General, Middle Eastern and
African Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Akitaka Saiki, DCM, Embassy of Japan
Shogo Yoshitake, Deputy Director, First North American

Division, MOFA Makoto Matsuda, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan

 $\underline{\mathbb{I}}$ 3. (C) SUMMARY. Under Secretary Burns and DFM Nishida met for four

hours and discussed a wide range of topics. Japan will keep some

Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) liaison personnel in Iraq, but PRTs

will be difficult due to security. Afghanistan drug production is a

problem which can perhaps be approached through the G8. Despite

press reports, the USG is committed to the diplomatic track on

resolving the Iran nuclear problem. Japan wants a response to  ${\tt PM}$ 

Koizumi's letter on UNSC reform.  $\mbox{U/S}$  Burns suggests a  $\mbox{Trilateral}$ 

Strategic Dialogue meeting in Tokyo in late May. END SUMMARY.

IRAN

 $\underline{\mathbb{1}}4$ . (C) Under Secretary Burns refuted press reports over the weekend

that the U.S. planned to attack Iran. Burns said the U.S. is firmly,

clearly, unequivocally on a diplomatic track. We are not looking

for a war with Iran, and the fact that there are military plans for

such an eventuality doesn't mean anything - we probably have plans

to invade Iceland. That said, we are not taking the military option off the table, but the emphasis is on diplomacy. Nishida

thanked Burns for reaffirming USG support for diplomacy. He noted

however that it would be better if the USG were more clear on its

policy. People are upset about Iraq, and will seize on these reports about Iran, which could upset diplomatic efforts. The U.S.  $\,$ 

needs to be clear that its focus is on diplomacy, and use a different

statement than "all options are on the table," which is ambiguous.

 $\underline{\ }$ 5. (S) Burns noted the key question is not when Iran can begin

manufacturing nuclear weapons, but rather when Iranian scientists

can master the knowledge and techniques necessary. Nishida agreed,  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

fearing they would reach that threshhold within a year.

16. (SBU) Further discussion on Iran septel.

# IRAQ - CONTINUED JAPANESE PARTICIPATION

 $\underline{{}^{\hspace{-0.1em} 1}}7.$  (C) Burns and Nishida discussed the need for the quick formation

of a government in Iraq, and the need for a more decisive  $\operatorname{Prime}$ 

Minister, and shared assessments of the situation in Iraq. Nishida,

referring to the Quad talks taking place in London, said Japan wanted

to maintain some sort of presence in Iraq after the Ground Self

Defense Forces (GSDF) contingent leaves. He said Japan needed to  ${\tt know}$ 

by April 21 when GSDF should be withdrawn, due to planning requirements.

Nishida said that Japan had decided to keep a small ASDF liaison

contingent in Baghdad and Basra, and noted that Japan's survey of

security conditions at various airports in Iraq was still underway.

¶8. (C) Turning to provincial reconstruction teams, Nishida said that

Japanese involvement would be difficult mostly due to security

concerns, but the GOJ is ready to listen. Burns stressed the value of

PRTs as a way to help extend the reach of Iraq's central government

into the provinces. Nishida noted that the GOJ sent a senior-level

delegation to Basra at the UK's request to look at a "kind of

and they reported that it was not safe, Japan's main reason for not

sending people on a permanent basis - but perhaps Japan could base

people in Kuwait and send them to PRTs on a temporary basis. When

Burns broached the possibility of the U.S. military providing security for Japanese PRT participants, Nishida said that was

"delicate" question.

## **AFGHANISTAN**

¶9. (C) Burns thanked Nishida for Japan's work in Afghanistan, in

particular OEF fueling support and work on the Kandahar-Heart and

Kabul-Kandahar roads. Nishida said Japan was accelerating its DDR

activities and was initiating DIAG (disarming illegal armed groups)

activities. Japan plans to invite Karzai to Tokyo in July to

DDR and DIAG plans. Nishida noted that the Central Asian countries

are also important, and thought that Afghanistan and the other Central

Asian countries might be a potential third target region in the

Strategic Development Alliance. Like Iraq, it would be difficult for

Japan to participate in PRTS in Afghanistan because of security.

110. (U) Burns noted news reports about MOFA's plans to reorganize its

office that covers Asia and noted that SCA A/S Boucher would be in

Tokyo April 24 for a Sri Lanka meeting; he suggested to DG Yoshikawa

he might want to meet with Boucher while he is there.

111. (C) Burns raised the problem of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan,

noting State's narcotics experts said we had spent \$250 million to

eradicate only 4000 hectares. Burns suggested discussing at

upcoming G8 political directors meeting a possible joint approach

within the G8 to try to convince Karzai to allow aerial eradication

of poppy. Nishida said Japan was also concerned.

NATO GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

 $\P12$ . (C) Burns said the US and UK have made a joint proposal for NATO's

consideration, which France will oppose, but we believe NATO will

support it. Nishida sees great value, but cautioned that we need to

coordinate our press points because this is a sensitive issue in Japan.

Burns and Nishida instructed Minister Kanehara and PDAS Stephens to work on this.

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## INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

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 $\underline{\P}13$ . (S) On the India civil nuclear initiative, Burns said the UK,

France, Russia, and IAEA all support. Merkel said Germany is divided

but in the end would be supportive. Burns gave Nishida a Indian

Government paper on the nuclear separation plan as well as recent

testimony by the Secretary on the issue and a White House fact sheet

on the non-proliferation issues. Nishida said he was glad to hear that

momentum on the Hill was swinging towards supporting the  $\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{deal}}}\xspace$  . Burns

said he understood how sensitive this issue is for Japan and promised

to provide follow-up briefings or information for the GOJ. Note:

SCA A/S Boucher will be in Tokyo for Sri Lanka meetings April 24;

this would be a good opportunity to push this initiative with MOFA.

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## TRILATERAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

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 $\P14.$  (S) Nishida said Japan is keen to work with the U.S. and Australia

in Central Asia and on intelligence cooperation. Burns said he was  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right)$ 

thinking of traveling to Tokyo the last week of May and would like to

hold a TSD meeting if convenient for Nishida (Nishida said he would

check his schedule). Burns also offered to host a TSD in Washington

a couple of months after the Tokyo meeting.

UNSC REFORM

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 $\P15$ . (C) Nishida said this was a high priority for the Prime Minister

and that they were waiting for the President's reply to Koizumi's

recent letter. Speaking personally, Nishida said hoped the  $\operatorname{USG}$  would

provide constructive comments on an expansion plan; if not Model C,

then what could the U.S. live with? Burns promised to get back to him on this.

G-8

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 $\P 16.$  (C) Burns asked Japan to support German poldir Schaefer's letter to

the Russians to discuss sensitive issues such as Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia. Nishida agreed. RICE